The short version
What this evidence tells us.
Market structure, regulatory findings, disclosed relationships and proven misconduct are different kinds of evidence. A complete accountability record needs the decision, the responsible institution, its reasons, implementation and outcomes.
Figures retain their own dates, populations and scope. The complete evidence and original source links remain below.
Evidence and context
Sector case: supermarkets
The ACCC's final inquiry summary describes a highly concentrated supermarket market dominated by Coles and Woolworths. It finds that the chains' sites and scale affect entry, that ALDI constrains prices for its narrower range, and that convenience limits consumers' willingness or ability to shop across multiple retailers. A national concentration description therefore does not measure local choice for every household. ACCC final summary, pp1–2 (opens in a new tab).
| Perspective | Regulator's finding | What must not be inferred |
|---|---|---|
| Consumers | Promotions and loyalty schemes can make value difficult to assess; time and convenience constrain switching | Every promotion is misleading, or every consumer can avoid high prices by shopping around |
| Suppliers | The major chains often have buyer power in fresh produce and some packaged groceries; dependence can transfer costs and risk to suppliers | Every supplier contract is unlawful, or every price difference is a profit margin |
| Owners and margins | ALDI, Coles and Woolworths increased average product margins over the five financial years considered; global profitability comparisons raise competition concerns | Product margin equals net profit, or a 2025 finding establishes the current 2026 margin |
| Remote communities | Prices can be higher because service costs are higher and local choice is limited; community-owned stores can help where alternatives are scarce | The same cost structure or solution applies in every remote community |
| Workers | Labour affects store capacity, service and costs | The inquiry summary supplies a complete measure of workers' pay, job security or bargaining outcomes |
These are attributed findings in the final summary, not independently re-estimated company accounts. The work/care package provides national labour context; it is not a supermarket workforce dataset. Ownership/control at the store and corporate-group level needs dated entity records; shares held through nominees do not reveal all ultimate beneficiaries.
The inquiry recommends changes to price access, promotional information, planning/entry and supplier dealings. A recommendation is not an implemented reform or an evaluated reduction in grocery bills. The record currently establishes the inquiry and findings; it does not mark every recommendation delivered. A useful follow-up is a dated recommendation-to-response-to-operation trace, with actual price/access outcomes. ACCC final-report landing page (opens in a new tab).
Evidence and context
Public purchasing and access for smaller businesses
Finance's 2024–25 estimates report 45,556 Commonwealth contracts to SMEs, 52.4% of contract volume. For contracts below $1bn, SMEs received 20.7% by value. These are different denominators; the value percentage must not be applied to all $104.9bn of reported procurement. Contract notices and amendments can cover multiple years and are not cash paid that year. Changes to reporting negative amendments also affect comparisons. An SME classification does not mean Australian ultimate ownership. Finance procurement statistics (opens in a new tab).
This national procurement baseline does not establish supermarket suppliers' bargaining power or identify which firms were excluded from a tender. Connect a particular contract only after matching ABN/entity, contract, dates and scope.
Evidence and context
Political finance, lobbying and scrutiny
The AEC published 2024–25 annual financial disclosures on 2 February 2026. Annual returns, election returns, donations, other receipts and expenditure have different definitions. Late returns, reporting thresholds and amended records matter. Availability is established here; company-to-party transactions have not been extracted into a reconciled national influence graph. AEC release (opens in a new tab).
The Commonwealth Lobbying Code governs defined third-party lobbying and registration. It is not an exhaustive diary of all corporate, union, community or in-house advocacy. Registration or a disclosed donation cannot establish that a decision was bought. A conflict declaration indicates a risk to manage, while an audit finding has its own scope and response status. Attorney-General's Department, Lobbying Code (opens in a new tab).
Responsibility and status: ACCC investigates/enforces within its remit; governments and parliaments decide reforms; retailers negotiate terms; procurement entities manage purchasing; AEC administers electoral disclosures. The sector findings and procurement baseline are checked. The full institutional-power specification is partial: no complete ownership map, supermarket workforce account or reconciled donation/lobbying/decision/audit chain is claimed. Existing WA gas and hospital decision traces demonstrate the required record structure without supplying missing supermarket evidence.